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Introduction
Governments often procure services, such as garbage collection or elderly care, from private …rms. A central issue in the debate on the merits of privatization has been how private and public …rms di¤er regarding quality and cost. The standard view of economic theory is that private …rms are cheaper than public …rms, but that they might shirk on quality provision (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Shleifer 1998) . In this paper, I develop a model of privatization that combines the multitask framework by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) with incomplete contracts.
1 My main result is that private …rms are cheaper for low levels of quality, but that they might be more expensive for high levels of quality when quality is measured imperfectly. As shown by Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) , ownership matters only if contracts are incomplete. If it were possible to write complete contracts, taking every contingency over the entire horizon of the …rm into account, the government could provide a private and a public …rm with exactly the same incentives. Many models of incomplete contracting build on Grossman and Hart (1986) , who assume that ownership allocates residual control rights that in ‡uence bargaining power in later stages of a contractual relationship. Notably, Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) assume that an owner of a private …rm has a stronger bargaining position toward the government than a manager of a public …rm. Therefore, the private provider has stronger incentives to implement innovations that improve quality or reduce costs. However, the private provider's incentives to cut costs might be too strong since he ignores any negative e¤ects on quality that the cost reduction might entail. As a result, private provision will always be cheaper than public provision, but may be either superior or inferior in terms of quality.
A distinguishing feature of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is that ex ante contracts are the same under private and public provision. This view contrasts with the extensive use of procurement agencies in developed economies. Whereas explicit contracts are scarce under public provision, privatization in service contracting seems to go hand in hand with extensive ex ante contracting. In this paper, I take the view that there is some scope for ex ante contracting on quality with private providers, but not with public providers. The basic di¤erence between the view of Grossman and Hart (1986) and this 1 paper is that whereas they distinguish between the ownership of assets and contractual compensation, I assume that integration shrinks the set of feasible compensation contracts. If the government holds the residual control rights, contracts on pro…t sharing or rewards for the completion of tasks could be manipulated ex post. Hence, like Schmidt (1996) , I view privatization as a commitment device of the government that resolves a timeinconsistency problem. 2 The agent in my model can invest e¤ort in improving service quality or reducing costs. Because of the commitment problem, employees of public …rms cannot be given strong incentives to engage in either of these tasks, implying that work e¤ort is low but balanced between quality improvements and cost reductions. In contrast, owners of private …rms always have strong incentives to cut costs and must be provided with …nancial incentives for quality provision in order to improve quality. As a result, when only weak incentives are feasible, the maximum level of quality is higher under public provision than under private provision. On the other hand, if strong incentives are feasible, the maximum level of quality is higher under private provision.
Although it is possible to contract on quality outcomes with a private provider, outcomes may only partly re ‡ect e¤ort. When this is the case, providing a private …rm with incentives to improve quality will force the owner of the …rm to bear risk, raising the price for a given level of quality. Public employees are insensitive to such measurement problems since they are paid a …xed wage regardless of the outcome. If owners of private …rms are su¢ ciently risk averse, private …rms are more expensive than public …rms for high levels of quality, even though they operate more e¢ ciently. I thus identify a potential non-monotonicity regarding the choice of ownership structure in government preference for quality: If strong incentives for quality are feasible, but e¤ort on quality is hard to measure, private provision is preferable when quality is considered either unimportant or very important whereas public provision is optimal when quality is of intermediate importance. This result di¤ers from the prediction of Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that private provision is always cheaper.
Though this paper focus on the cost of risk, the main argument of the paper -that private …rms are cheaper for low levels of quality but may be more expensive for high levels of quality -holds as long as there is some signi…cant cost of providing private …rms with strong incentives for quality. Such costs could also arise if contracting itself is costly or because of limited liability.
The model's predictions …t well with the empirical evidence on service contracting. There is substantial evidence that privatization reduces costs without a detrimental e¤ect on quality for services such as refuse collection and cleaning services, where measurability of quality can be assumed to be good. 3 In contrast, privatization of a more complex service like hospital care has not been shown to reduce costs in general. Empirical evidence also supports the selection of services for privatization implied by the model. In a comprehensive study on service contracting in American cities, Levin and Tadelis (2007) …nd that services for which it is harder to write and administer performance contracts are less likely to be privatized. Further, services that city managers rank lower in terms of resident sensitivity to quality are more likely to be bought from private …rms. This paper di¤ers from most previous theoretical papers on privatization, like La¤ont and Tirole (1993) and Schmidt (1996) , in its emphasize on quality issues. 4 However, this paper is not the …rst to argue that costs of providing private …rms with incentives for quality is important in public sector contracting. For example, Donahue (1989, p. 87 and p. 105) and Sclar (2000, p. 109) both argue that the inability to accurately measure e¤ort on quality may lead to an suboptimal allocation of risk under private provision. Levin and Tadelis (2007) develop a model of service contracting that is similar to mine in the sense that they focus on the cost of contracting on quality under private provision, though their setup is quite di¤erent and they do not consider risk. I present the model in the next section, and the main results are laid out in Section 3. In Section 4, I discuss some extensions of the basic model. Allowing for contracting on cost, I …nd that although contracts are complete in the sense that a private …rm can be provided with exactly the same incentives as a public …rm, ownership still matters. If e¤ort on quality and cost are su¢ ciently hard to measure, public provision is still cheaper than private provision for high levels of quality. Extending the model to allow for di¤erences in task attractiveness, I …nd that public …rms shun unattractive tasks, whereas private …rms undertake them if incentives are strong enough. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Model
The principal is a public agency that has to decide whether to procure a service from the market or produce it in-house. The agent is a service provider. When service provision is organized in-house, I refer to the service provider as the manager, with private provision, the service provider is called owner.
A service provider can put e¤ort on to two di¤erent tasks. The …rst task (t q ) improves the quality of the service and the other (t c ) reduces its costs. Engagement in the two tasks entails a cost C (t) for the service provider, where t = t q + t c . The cost function, C (t), is strictly convex, twice continuously di¤erentiable and minimized at t > 0, i.e., people are assumed to exert some e¤ort even in the absence of …nancial incentives. Unlike a recent literature on the role of intrinsic motivation, or sense of mission, in public bureaucracies or non-pro…t organizations, I assume that there is no selection on agents'type into private or public …rms.
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The outcome of the cost reducing task is certain, but e¤ort on cost reductions is not observable to the public agency. 6 The cost reduction is given by a function S(t c ) which is increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable in t c . Total cost is thus decreasing in S(t c ). In contrast to cost savings, the e¤ort on quality is observable, albeit imperfectly. Formally, the public agency receives a signal of quality q = t q + " q , where " q is a stochastic term with distribution " q N 0; 2 q . It is only possible to contract on outcomes (q) and not directly on e¤ort (t q ).
The public agency's valuation of service quality is described by a function B (t q ; ) ; which is increasing and strictly concave in t q for all > 0. is a parameter that denotes the public agency's valuation of quality. I assume that B (t q ; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable in both t q and , lim !1 B (t q ; ) = 1, B tq (t q ; 0) = 0 for all t q and lim !1 B tq (t q ; ) = 1 for all t q , where B tq (t q ; ) denotes the partial derivative of B (t q ; ) with respect to t q . The service provider's utility is de…ned as u (x) = e rx , where r is a measure of risk aversion and x is the …nancial return minus the cost of e¤ort. I assume that r > 0. The public agency is risk neutral. The service provider receives a pecuniary compensation w (q) = q + and a share of cost savings 2 [0; 1]. The parameter is thus a measure of the economic incentive 5 See, for instance, Francois (2000) ; Glaeser and Shleifer (2001); and Besley and Ghatak (2005) . 6 I relax the assumption that e¤ort on cost reductions is not contractible in Section 4.1. 4 to engage in the quality improving task and is a …xed wage component. Similarly, denotes the incentive to reduce costs. We get x = w (q) + S(t c ) C (t) and the manager/owner's expected utility is thus
where CE is the certainty equivalent. Solving for CE, we get
2 is the agent's risk premium. I refer to the product r 2 q as the cost of risk. As the risk premium is a convex function of the strength of incentives, we should not expect risk to be an important consideration when incentives are low-powered.
The agent's outside option is normalized to zero, implying that the participation constraint is CE 0. Assuming perfect competition, the …xed wage component will be set such that the participation constraint always binds.
How do private and public …rms di¤er in this model? The key assumption is that the public agency cannot credibly commit to high-powered incentives, e.g., payment depending on the completion of tasks or pro…t sharing, under public (in-house) provision. In terms of the model, this means that = 0 and = 0. The argument for this assumption is that ownership gives control over key contractual parameters, which enlarges the public agency's scope for opportunistic behavior. For example, if the manager has a share in the …rm's pro…ts, the owner could in ‡uence stated pro…ts by changing accounting procedures. Alternatively, the public agency could override the manager's decisions in a way that in ‡icts on his chances of reaching performance clauses. Another fundamental commitment problem is the existence of the public …rm itself. If the public agency cannot commit to not sell or close down the public …rm in the future, it is hard to commit to incentives for outcomes that are observable only in the long run. This in turn a¤ects the optimal level of incentives for tasks that are observable in the short run as strong incentives on such tasks will crowd out e¤ort on tasks where outcomes are only observable in the long run. Hence, the inability to commit to long-run incentives creates a problem of intertemporal incentive balance. There are also some less fundamental reasons for why it might be di¢ cult to provide managers of public …rms with strong incentives. In many countries, employment protection laws and union wage bargaining restrict the space of feasible employment contracts. For example, it might more di¢ cult to …re an employee should he deviate from the contractual terms than cease business with a private …rm.
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Private …rms have a stronger legal position toward the public agency in the sense that it is harder for the public agency to manipulate contracts ex post. In addition, contracts with private …rms are not constrained by employment regulations. However, even though contractual compensation under private provision can be based on observable outcomes, not every contract is credible ex ante. For example, if the re-tendering of contracts is costly, public procurers may not be able to commit to cancel a contract in case of poor performance. Relatedly, contracts that entail the bankrupcy of the …rm in some states of the world might not be renegotiation-proof. Moreover, public procurement procedures are often subject to regulations that aim to reduce the risk of collusion between bureaucrats and …rms. As pointed out by Wilson (2000, p. 10 in the preface), such regulations make it hard for the government purchaser to take past experience of a …rm into account, thereby limiting the scope for implicit contracting on quality. 8 In practice, high penalties might not be enforcable buy a court.
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If high-powered incentives for quality provision are not credible ex ante, the set of possible contracts is limited by some upper bound on , i.e.
2 [0; ]. 10 We can also think of as a reduced form for contractual incompleteness. For simplicity, there is only one dimension of quality in the model. In reality, service quality consists of a very large number of distinct tasks, some of which might be impossible or too costly to put in a contract. Since e¤ort on the cost reducing task is unobservable to the public agency and the owner of the private …rm has the residual control rights, = 1 in case of private provision. The assumption that cost savings are unobservable might seem stark and I will relax it in an extension below. However, the assumption makes more sense if we include activities 7 The public sector may of course rely on indirect means to provide public sector managers with incentives, such as career concerns. When assuming weak incentives in the public sector, we are thus implicitly assuming that public bureaucracies are not highly meritocratic.
8 Dalen et al. (2006) develop a model where the prospect of contract renewal provides incentives for private …rms to supply quality. They …nd that incentives for quality are maximized when 50 % of contracts are renewed. 9 One example of this is Italy, where the value of penalities cannot exceed 10 percent of the overall contract value (see Albano et al., 2006) . 10 We also can think of as a reduced form of implicit contracting (such as relational contracting or reputation e¤ects), though the game played by principal and agent is not modelled explicitly. 6 that a¤ect the …rm's cost structure over the long term in the de…nition of cost savings. In this case, a wide range of activities that might have a negative immediate impact on pro…ts would count as e¤ort on cost reductions. Examples include many tasks which are hard to contract on directly, such as equipment maintenance, the development of administrative systems and human resource management. Such costs are also not easy to estimate from accounting data. For example, consider a garbage collector. One of the costs of garbage collection is that the value of the trucks used to collect the garbage is run down over time. If the public agency owns the …rm, it just buys a new truck whenever the old trucks are worn out and costs does not have to be measured. If the private …rm owns the trucks, the trucks' condition need to be evaluated to determine the true cost of collecting the garbage over the contractual term. Such an evaluation is costly and arguably subject to some measurement error. 
Public …rm
Since the public agency cannot commit to incentive payment schemes under public provision, and are equal to zero. The manager's maximization problem is therefore 12 max tq;tc C (t).
(
Since the agent is indi¤erent between the two tasks he just minimizes his cost function with respect to total e¤ort. 13 This gives the optimality condition t q + t c = t where
Since the manager is indi¤erent between tasks I assume that he divides his e¤ort according to the wishes of the public agency. 14 The public agency's maximization 11 A similar argument can be made in support of the assumption that it is hard to give public sector managers strong incentives to save costs. The only time when an owner of a private …rm need to measure the result of investments made to improve e¢ ciency is when he sells the …rm. In contrast, for a manager of a public …rm to get the correct compensation, contracts need to specify exactly the contribution to cost e¢ ciency made by the manager during a certain period of time.
12 Note that since u (CE) is a monotone transformation of CE, maximizing CE is equivalent to maxi-
13 The assumption that the manager is indi¤erent between tasks is discussed in Section 4.2. 14 I thus implicitly assume that the agent has lexicographic preferences where his …rst priority is to maximize his own utility and his second priority to maximize his principal's utility. 7 problem is then max tq;tc
Let the superscript m denote the manager of the public …rm. The solution to this problem is
Hence, the manager of the public …rm sets the total level of e¤ort and the public agency decides how this e¤ort should be divided between the two tasks. The public agency orders the manager to set t q = 0 if the marginal value of quality at t q = 0 is weakly lower than the marginal bene…t of cost savings at t c = t . When the public agency's valuation of quality is higher, the manager is instructed to put e¤ort on quality until the marginal value of quality equals the marginal value of cost reductions. The second corner solution occurs when the public agency's marginal valuation of quality at t q = t is weakly higher than the marginal returns to cost savings at t c = 0. The division of e¤ort between tasks is therefore optimal under public provision, whereas total work e¤ort is suboptimally low.
Private …rm
Since cost savings are unobservable and the owner of the private …rm is the residual claimant to the …rm's pro…t, we have that = 1. The owner's maximization problem is max tq;tc
Let the superscript o denote the owner of the private …rm. The solution to this problem is 
In the …rst corner solution, t, t q and t c are una¤ected by . Accordingly, for 0 S 0 (t)
Hence, if incentives for quality provision are weak, the agent only puts e¤ort into reducing costs and total work e¤ort is low, though still higher than under public provision. As the incentive for quality provision gets stronger, the owner increases total e¤ort and reduces e¤ort on cost reductions, implying that e¤ort on quality increases. If incentives for quality provision are very strong, the owner of the private …rm only puts e¤ort into increasing quality. In addition to its e¤ect on e¤ort choice, also a¤ects the agent's risk-premium, given that there is uncertainty in the signal q (i.e. 2 q > 0). The public agency's maximization problem is
Since the …xed wage component is set to satisfy the owner's participation constraint, the public agency's maximization problem can be reformulated as
In the interior solution, we get the …rst-order condition
1=C 00 (t) 1=S 00 (t c ) + r 2 q ; which can be rewritten as
Though condition (5) seems to imply that the higher is the cost of risk, the lower is the strength of incentives for quality provision, a positive cost of risk also implies that the public agency's maximization problem need not be concave in , and that there might be more than one interior solution.
17 Let W ( ) denote the public agency's valuation of
2 . Further, let = arg max 2A W ( ) where A is the set of feasible interior solutions. 18 To …nd the optimal contract, we have to compare the surplus under the corner solutions = 0 and = with the feasible interior solutions. 19 The optimal feasible contract is then:
Results
The highest possible level of quality from a public …rm is simply t m q = t . In that case, the public agency orders the manager of the public …rm to spend all his e¤orts on increasing quality. How high quality can be obtained from a private …rm depends on the set of feasible incentives. In the one extreme, if the owner of the private …rm can only be provided with weak incentives to invest in quality ( S 0 (t)), it is not possible to induce the private …rm to invest in quality at all. Yet if strong incentives on quality provision are feasible (that is, if is high), the maximum feasible level of quality from a private …rm exceeds that of a public …rm.
Proposition 1 If strong incentives are feasible, in the sense that the permissible incentive intensity exceeds some …nite threshold level b , a private …rm can be induced to produce a higher quality than the public …rm. If instead falls short of b , a private …rm cannot be induced to produce as high quality as a public …rm.
Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
17 Non-concavity could be ruled out by assuming that C 000 (t) 0 and S 000 (t c ) 0. This is shown in the Appendix. 18 The set of feasible interior solutions might be empty. 19 W ( ) is a continuous function since all the arguments are continuous in (as shown in the proof to Proposition 1). As the derivatives of both t q and t c are zero for < S 0 (t), it follows that the derivative of W ( ) is negative for all < S 0 (t). Hence, whenever the public agency's optimal solution implies t q = 0, we have = 0.
The result that private …rms can have either higher or lower quality depending on the economic environment is also present in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , but their argument is di¤erent from mine. In their paper, the di¤erence in quality depends on the relative importance of the quality-enhancing innovation and the negative e¤ect on quality of cost reductions, whereas in my case it depends on the set of feasible incentives. Moreover, the di¤erence between private and public production in Proposition 1 only refers to the maximum level of quality; whether a potential di¤erence is realized hinges on the set by the public agency. Let us now focus on di¤erences in cost.
First, note that private provision is always cheaper than public provision for the lowest level of quality, t q = 0. In that case, the manager of the public …rm sets t m c = t and total cost is C (t ) S (t ). Since C 0 (t ) = 0 < S 0 (t ), this is clearly a suboptimally low level of e¤ort. In contrast, the owner of the private …rm is the residual claimant to cost savings and sets t o c = t > t which is the e¢ cient level of e¤ort. Moreover, the marginal cost for the public agency to increase quality is always lower under private provision than under public provision if the cost of risk r 2 q is su¢ ciently small. To see this, note that for any given value of t q we have that t o c > t m c which by strict concavity of the costsaving function implies that
The cost of additional quality in terms of forgone cost savings is thus always larger for public than for private …rms. However, the cost advantage of private provision vanishes for high levels of quality when the cost of risk is high. Since the public agency must increase to induce the private …rm to exert more e¤ort on quality, the risk premium q , the marginal cost of quality is therefore higher under private provision than under public provision for any feasible level of quality. There is also a …xed cost of going from zero to positive levels of quality under private provision. For 0 < S 0 (t), the owner of the private …rm do not increase e¤ort on t q as increases, but costs increase due to the higher the risk premium. Since private …rms are always cheaper for zero quality, private provision is cheaper than public …rms for low levels of quality, but more expensive for high levels of quality when r 2 q is high.
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Proposition 2 There is a cost of risk c r 2 q such that private …rms are cheaper for no e¤ort on quality, but more expensive for all levels of quality above a …nite threshold b t q . If b t q > 0, private …rms are cheaper for all quality levels below b t q . 20 Note that, in the extreme case, "low levels of quality" refers to t q = 0. Figure 1 gives two parametric examples with di¤erent levels of cost of risk. In the …rst case, we set r 2 q = 0 and private provision is cheaper for all levels of e¤ort on quality and the di¤erence is increasing in the level of quality. The cost for no e¤ort on quality is unchanged when we assume a positive cost of risk r 2 q = 0:45 , but exhibits a discontinuous jump when quality is increased above zero. The reason for this is that the strength of incentives for quality provision must be increased from = 0 to = S 0 (t) + , where is some very small number larger than zero. In this particular case, costs are similar under public and private provision for medium levels of quality, but private provision is more expensive for high levels of quality. However, the highest levels of quality can only be obtained from a private …rm. If we were to increase the cost of risk even higher, we would eventually reach the case where private provision is cheaper for zero e¤ort on quality, but more expensive for all positive levels of quality.
[FIGURE 1]
Now, let us discuss the public agency's choice of ownership structure. Assuming that strong incentives are feasible, whether the service will be bought from a private or a public …rm depends on the public agency's willingness to pay for quality, , and the cost of risk, r 2 q . If either or r 2 q are low, private provision will be superior since it is cheapest. Conversely, if the public agency has a high valuation of quality and r 2 q is high, a rational public agency prefers public provision since the risk premium makes private provision more expensive for high levels of quality. However, since it is not possible to extract quality in excess of t q from public …rms, private provision is better if the public agency's willingness to pay for quality is very high. There is thus a potential non-monotonicity regarding the choice of ownership structure in government preference for quality.
Proposition 3 If the upper bound of contractibility on quality, , is such that an e¤ort on quality exceeding t q can be extracted from private …rms, private provision is superior if quality is either considered unimportant or very important, and if r Proposition 4 If the upper bound of contractibility on quality, , is such that the maximum level of quality under private provision is below t q , public provision is superior when quality is important.
To summarize, we have two cases where public ownership may be superior to private ownership, namely: i) when weak feasible incentives for e¤ort on quality make private provision above a certain quality level impossible, and ii) when the di¢ culty in measuring quality makes private …rms more expensive for high levels of quality.
The model predicts that privatization will reduce costs without any deteriation of quality for services where quality is easy to measure. This prediction …ts well with the large amount of empirical studies that …nd signi…cant cost reductions from privatization of services like garbage collection or cleaning services.
21 Even a critic of privatization such as Elliot Sclar (2000) argues that "privatization of many blue-collar services certainly may be cost e¤ective" (p. 57). 22 In contrast, privatization has not been shown to cut costs signi…cantly in hospital care. 23 This is in line with the model's predictions under the assumptions that quality is important but hard to measure. 24 The thrust of the argument is similar if there are costs other than risk associated with providing incentives for quality. For example, there might be signi…cant costs associated with formulating adequate contracts on quality in hospital care.
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The model also illustrates the importance of controlling for market selection in empirical studies of privatization. For services where quality is hard to measure, only public agencies with a low (or very high) valuation of quality will go for private provision. Hence, unless quality is adequately controlled for, empirical studies are likely to overstate 21 See, for example, Donahue (1989) , Wilson (1989) , Hilke (1992) , Domberger and Jensen (1997) , and the references cited in these works. 22 A contrasting view is Ohlsson (2003) , who argues that much of the literature on refuse collection has overstated the cost saving e¤ect of privatization due to a failure to control for selection bias. 23 See references in Wilson (1989), Hilke (1992) , and Currie et al (2003) . 24 See and for an argument that it is di¢ cult to measure performance in the health care sector. In the survey of city managers reported in Levin and Tadelis (2007) , emergency hospital care rank as number seven in contracting di¢ culty and number one in resident sensitivity to quality of thirty di¤erent services. 25 Another aspect of privatization in health care is many health care services are credence goods, i.e., producers have private information on the quantity and quality that it would be optimal for the buyer to buy. Privatization may therefore also increase cost through overtreatment of patients or by charging for treatment not undertaken. See Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for an overview of the theoretical research on credence goods and Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Sloan et al. (2001) for empirical studies that focus on privatization and the credence good aspect of hospital care. the cost-saving e¤ect of private provision. 26 Empirical evidence supports the selection of services for privatization implied by the model. In a comprehensive study on service contracting in American cities, Levin and Tadelis (2007) …nd that services for which it is harder to write and administer performance contracts are less likely to be privatized. Further, services that city managers rank lower in terms of resident sensitivity to quality are more likely to be privatized. The result that privatization is bene…cial due to lower cost when quality is not important is also present in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . However, when quality is important, the model in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) predicts that privatization is bene…cial when there is a large scope for non-contractible quality improvements and noncontractible cost reductions have a little e¤ect on quality. Hence, unlike my model, their model does not give a clear prediction whether services for which it is hard to contract on quality will be more or less likely to be privatized.
Another reason why privatization might not save costs is that agency problems within private …rms make the incentives for top executives similar to those of public managers. If a …rm owner that hires a manager to run his business faces the same commitment problem as the government, privatization does not change anything in the context of this model. 27 Hence, privatization might have its largest impact when private …rms are relatively small and owner-led and economic models focusing on the impact of ownership (like this paper) might only be applicable to a subset of privatization cases. Relatedly, an implication of this model is that privatization works better when capital markets function well and owners are able to diversify risks.
Finally, let us brie ‡y consider the di¤erences between contracting out in the private and public sector. One might argue that the problem of providing managers with strong incentives is worse in the public than in the private sector, since the latter can rely on the information given by stock prices. This would imply that contracting out is particularly important in the public sector. However, there are also reasons for why contracting could be more di¢ cult in the public sector. For example, procurement laws might make implicit contracting through repeated interaction harder and contracts with private providers are often in practice enforced by government bureaucrats with weak incentives to do a good job.
Extensions

Contracting on cost
So far, I have analyzed the case where it is only possible to contract on quality. Here I relax this assumption and let the public agency and the private …rm contract on cost.
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As we will see, because of the residual risk, it is not possible to replicate the public …rm even under full contractibility on quality and cost.
Under no cost contracting, the owner of the …rm is the residual claimant to cost savings and = 1. Hence, cost contracting implies that the …rm and the government sign a contract that gives the private …rm less than the full share of cost savings, in e¤ect a cost-plus contract where the …rm gets compensation for costs incurred.
29 Accordingly, complete cost-plus contracting corresponds to = 0. The cost contracting problem is thus not to provide private …rms with strong incentives to cut costs, but to mitigate those incentives, and the commitment problem is to make a high degree of compensation credible. In terms of our model, the lower is t c , the larger is the compensation from the government to the private …rm. Let = 1 denote the share of costs for which the owner is compensated. I assume that 2 [0; 1], though in principle there might be some upper bound on contractibility on cost 2 [0; 1] so that 2 [0; ]. The principal receives a signal of costs v = S (t c ) + " v where " v N (0; 2 v ) and the agent's compensation is w(q; v) = q + v. I assume that the errors in q and v are independent, i.e., Cov (" q ; " v ) = 0. The owner's monetary payo¤, x, is then normally distributed with E (x) = t q + C (t) + (1 ) S (t c ) and
2 . This gives us the owner's maximization problem max tq;tc
28 I keep the assumption that no contract on the completion of tasks is possible under public provision. 29 I assume that it is not possible for the owner of the private …rm to extract revenue by increasing costs, for example by increasing his own wage.
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The solution to this problem is
f (t q ; t c )j t q + t c = t g if = 0 and = 1;
In the interior solution (excluding the case when = 0 and = 1), we get t o , t 
The public agency's maximization problem is therefore
We get the …rst-order condition with respect to ;
and the …rst-order condition with respect to ;
As above, the maximization problem is not necessarily concave in and . The basic insight from this extension of the model is that the level of incentives for quality provision ( ) needed to ensure a certain level of quality (t q ) is falling in the extent of cost-plus contracting ( ). By compensating the owner of the …rm for his costs, incentives to invest in cost reductions are muted, implying that e¤ort on the cost reducing task falls, which makes the cost of e¤ort for engaging in quality provision lower on the margin. 31 Hence, by lowering the incentives for cost reductions, a higher level of quality can be exerted for any given level of incentives for quality provision. This has two potential advantages: First, it mitigates the problem of weak feasible incentives for quality provision. Second, for a given level of quality, incentives for quality can be less high-powered, thereby lowering the cost of risk.
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Note that setting = 0 and = 1 gives the owner of the private …rm exactly the same incentives as the manager of the public …rm. However, if r 2 v > 0, the owner of the private …rm have to bear risk, making private provision more expensive. Hence, ownership matters also when a private …rm can be provided with exactly the same incentives as a public …rm. Actually, even if contracts are complete (in the sense that = 1 and = 1), public provision is still cheaper than private provision for high levels of quality if r 
Task attractiveness
A key result of the model is that private …rms underinvest in tasks for which they have no …nancial incentives, whereas the drawback of public provision is the low level of total e¤ort. This is in accordance with previous models of privatization like Schmidt (1996) and Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) . An implicit assumption in these models, as well as my model, is that tasks do not di¤er in terms of their inherent attractiveness. Yet if some tasks are inherently less attractive than others (for example because they are boring or di¢ cult to undertake), the incentive balance problem might be reversed. The manager of a public …rm, who lacks …nancial incentives for any particular task, underinvests in those tasks that he or she for some reason …nds unattractive. The owner of the private …rm 31 As long as > (1 ) S 0 (t), total e¤ort is determined by , and does only determine the allocation across tasks -the higher is , the larger must S 0 (t c ) be for a given , implying that t c is falling in . For 0
(1 ) S 0 (t), total e¤ort is determined solely by , but then there's no rationale for setting > 0, except for eliminating all incentives for cost reductions by setting = 1 32 Conditions under which the principal will set > 0 are provided in the Appendix. also dislikes the unattractive task, but this is at least partly o¤set by an explicit …nancial incentive.
Let t u denote e¤ort on the unattractive task. I assume that t u , t q and t c are perfect substitutes in the cost of e¤ort, i.e., t = t u + t q +t c . E¤ort on t u also comes at an additional cost of e¤ort D (t u ), which is an increasing and strictly convex function with D 0 (0) > 0.
I assume that e¤ort on t u is perfectly observable and hence contractible in case of private provision. The owner of the private …rm is compensated according to the linear wage contract
The owner's maximization problem then becomes max tq, tc, tu
Solving this problem, we …nd that the owner of the private …rm will put e¤ort on the unattractive task if ! > D 0 (0) + max f ; S 0 (t)g. Note that e¤ort on cost reductions and quality are both crowded out by strong incentives for the unattractive task. Since the public agency cannot commit to any incentive scheme under public provision, we have = 0 and ! = 0, implying that the public manager's maximization problem is max tq;tc;tu
Hence, under public provision, the manager sets t u = 0 and t q + t c = t . Note that I implicitly assume that the government cannot restrict the work description of the public …rm to only include t u , in which case the task allocation problem might be overcome. 33 By the same argument, di¤erences in task attractiveness also provides a rationale for limiting worker freedom within organizations.
Proposition 6 Public …rms shun unattractive tasks, but private …rms undertake them if incentives are strong enough.
33 For the manager of the public …rm to set t u > 0, we must have that jC 0 (0)j > D 0 (0). Note that if t u is not an argument in C (t) (that is, the cost of e¤ort on t q and t c are independent of t u ), then the manager of the public …rm will always set t u = 0.
Instead of an additional unattractive task, we could consider the relative task attractiveness of t q and t c . For example, it is conceivable that improving quality is a more attractive task than reducing costs. If so, it would not be possible to induce a manager of a public …rm to put e¤ort on cost reductions. This is an important caveat to the assumption above that the manager of the public …rm is indi¤erent between improving quality and reducing costs.
Just as public providers are likely to avoid unattractive tasks, they will choose to undertake any task which seems particularly attractive. For example, a manager in a public …rm might focus unduly on activities that are "in vogue", even if they are not central to the mandate of the …rm. This observation suggests that it is important not to give managers of public …rms a too wide mandate.
Concluding remarks
This paper has argued that di¤erences in ex ante contracts is an important feature of privatization of service provision. Under private provision, procurement agencies write elaborate contracts with private …rms, whereas managers under in-house provision seldom have explicit incentive contracts. The focus on ex ante contracts gives a di¤erent result regarding the cost e¢ ciency of private production compared to previous theory. Privatization typically increases the incentives to cut costs, implying that private …rms need to be given incentives not to shirk on quality. In this paper, I have considered one cost of such incentives: if quality cannot be measured perfectly, high-powered incentives for quality imply that the private …rm will be exposed to risk, thereby increasing costs for high levels of quality. However, the basic argument that privatization may increase cost for high levels of quality remains intact if we instead consider some other type of cost, like contractual rents due to limited liability or the cost of writing contracts and monitoring performance.
References
Albano, G. L., Calzolari, G., Dini, F., Iossa, E., and Spagnolo, G. and so t o ( ) = t o c ( ) = t for 0 S 0 (t). Since C (t) is strictly convex and increasing for t > t , = C 0 (t) is invertible for t < t < t where t is such that lim t!t C 0 (t) = 1. As C(t) is also twice continuously di¤erentiable, the inverse function t o ( ) is continuously increasing in for > S 0 (t) = C 0 (t) with lim !1 t o ( ) = t. The owner's e¤ort on quality is given by t 
With contracting on costs
For = 0 and = 1, the owner of the …rm is indi¤erent between t q and t c and all allocations of e¤ort such that t q + t c = t are feasible. However, as soon as > 0 and = 1, the owner will set t c = 0 or, alternatively, when = 0 and < 1, the owner will set t q = 0. Hence, t 
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The public agency' s maximization problem
The public agency's maximization problem without contracting on costs is
Since the public agency is risk neutral, we get
The …xed wage is set just to let the participation constraint bind, i.e., so that CE = 0. Reformulating the CE, we get
Substituting into (11), we get
This maximimization problem can be reformulated as
s.t. .
First and second derivatives
Without contracting on cost The …rst derivative of the public agency's maximization problem with respect to is
The second derivative with respect to becomes
which can be either larger or smaller than zero. The second derivative is negative for certain if B tq (t q ; ) = S 0 (t c ) = C 0 (t) (which is the case if r 2 q = 0) or if C 000 (t) 0 and
With contracting on cost The …rst derivative of the public agency's maximization problem with respect to is
which is not de…ned for = 1. The second derivative with respect to is
The …rst derivative of the public agency's maximization problem with respect to is
This derivative is positive for = 0 whenever B tq (t q ; ) > S 0 (t c ).
For the public agency to set > 0 it must either be the case that the cost of risk is positive or that strong incentives for quality are infeasible. To see this, suppose that we restict to zero. The public agency's problem is then exactly the same as without contracting on cost. Further, suppose that quality is so important that the solution to the public agency's problem is such that t q > 0 and that the incentive feasibility constraint does not bind. Then if r 2 q > 0, we see from (7) that = S 0 (t c ) < B tq (t q ; ) and so = 0 cannot be optimal. Similarly, will be strictly above zero if strong incentives for quality provision are not feasible, i.e., if B tq (t q ( ; 0) ; ) > S 0 (t c ( ; 0)), but quality is so important that t q ( ; 0) is preferred over t q = 0. Before we consider the second derivative of the public agency's maximization problem with respect to , note that the derivative of
# with respect to can be written as
Using this, we can write the second derivative of the owner's maximization problem with respect to as
Note that it can never be optimal to set ( ; ) such that S 0 (t c ) > B tq (t q ; ), since the public agency then can achieve both a better allocation of the agents e¤ort and reduce the cost of risk by reducing or . Since B tq (t q ; ) S 0 (t c ), a su¢ cient condition for the second derivative to be negative is that
Finally, the cross-partial derivative is
Since the cross-partial is not zero, it is a nontrivial exercise to derive conditions under which the Hessian matrix is negative de…nite. As it is not important for any of the results presented in the paper, I abstain from deriving these conditions here.
Proofs 7.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From (1), we know that the maximum level of quality under public provision is t m q = t . Since t > t , there exists some
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the function t (4) we also know that (0) = 0. Total costs for a given level of quality under private provision is then given by
for 0 t q t. As t o q , C (t) and S (t c ) are continuous functions for t q > 0, K o ( (t q )) is a continuous function of t q for t q > 0:
Total costs under public provision is given by
for 0 t q t q , which is a continuous function by continuity of S (t c ). First, consider the cost for no e¤ort on quality. In case of private provision, we get
which is the amount of e¤ort that minimizes K. Since t is such that C (t ) = 0 < S (t ), it follows that
Second, consider the cost for t q > 0. In case of private provision, we get
) is a …nite number and t
In contrast, total costs under public provision is given by
which is a …nite number for all t q t q . By continuity of K o ( (t q )) and K m (t q ) for t q > 0, there exists a …nite value c r 2 q for all 0 < t q t q such that,
q . Third, consider the marginal cost of quality under private provision for t q > 0;
is positive, and @ @t q > 0; it follows that
is …nite for all t q t , for t q > 0 there exists a …nite value f r 2 q such that
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It follows that there exists some r 2 q > max c r 2 q ; f r 2 q such that private provision is cheaper for zero e¤ort on quality but more expensive for e¤ort on quality above some …nite threshold t q < t q . As marginal cost is higher under private provision for t q > 0, costs can be the same for at most one level of e¤ort on quality.
Proof of Proposition 3
I …rst show that public provision can be superior. As K m t m q K o (0) is a …nite number and B (t q ; ) is continuous in with lim !1 B (t q ; ) = 1, there always exists some …nite e such that B t > B (0; ) K o (0) for all > e . That is, if quality is su¢ ciently important, the optimal level of quality from public provision is superior to zero quality from a private …rm. We know from Proposition 2 that lim r 2 q !1 K o (t q ) = 1 for all t o q > 0. It follows that the surplus under private provision approaches B (0; ) K o (0) from above when r 2 q goes to in…nity. Hence, for all > e , there also exists a …nite cost of risk c r 2 q ( ) such that public provision is preferred to private provision for r 2 q > c r 2 q ( ). Second, consider the case when quality is unimportant ( = 0). Since B tq (t q ; 0) = 0 for all t q we get from the solutions to (2) and (4) that the optimal level of t q is equal to zero both under private and public provision. From Proposition 2, we know that K o (0) < K m (0), and so private provision is superior.
Before we consider the case when quality is very important, we establish that there exists some …nite such that the public agency will set so that t o q ( ) > t t m q . As lim !1 B (t q ; ) = 1 and K o t o q is a …nite number for any t q < t, there exists for all 0 < t q < t some …nite value of such that B (t q ; ) K o (t q ) > B (0; ) K o (0). We can therefore rule out the corner solution = 0. Since lim !1 B tq (t q ; ) = 1, we get from (5) that lim !1 = 1. for all > b . Now, suppose that r 2 q > c r 2 q ( ) for some > e . We know from above that private provision is superior if = 0 or > b r 2 q and that there exists some above e but below b r 2 q such that public provision is superior.
Proof of Proposition 4
We know from Proposition 1 that there exists an b such that t 
Proof of Proposition 5
For any feasible level of e¤ort on quality, there is some nonempty set of parameter values ( ; ) that induces the private …rm to put down this particular level of e¤ort (the particular parameter values that minimize costs for a certain level of quality will vary depending on r 2 q and r 2 v ). Let (t q ) and (t q ) denote the values of the incentive parameters that minimize total cost to the public agency for a certain level of t q . Then, total cost for a given level of quality is
Note that ( ; ) = (0; 0) is the only optimal solution for t q = 0. We therefore get the same result as in Proposition 2 regarding cost for zero e¤ort on quality, i.e., K o (0; 0) =
Second, for any t q > 0, we must have that either and or both are strictly larger than zero. Since C (t o ( )) S (t o c ( ; )) is …nite, costs approach in…nity for the whole set of parameter values that give a certain t q (including the set that minimize costs) when both r such that K o (t q ) > K m (t q ) for any t q 2 (0; t ]:
Proof of Proposition 6
Since D 0 (t u ) > 0 for all t u > 0, t u = 0 and t q + t c = t solves the manager's problem (10). In case of private provision (9), the …rst-order condition with respect to t u is ! D 0 (t u ) C 0 (t). Since C 0 (t) = max f ; S 0 (t)g the owner will set t u > 0 if and only if ! > D 0 (0) + max f ; S 0 (t)g.
Numerical example
Assume the functional forms C (t) = (t 2) 8 ; S (t c ) = 5 log (t c + 1) ; In the corner solution where t q = 0, we get S 0 (t) = C 0 (t) ; 5 t + 1 = 8(t 2) 7 ; t = 2: 7735:
and so the highest level of for which t we have t c = 0, but this point is never reached in the cases I simulated.
